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Summary findings
Different ways of discussing  development strategy often  *  The government more effectively controls fiscal
reflect different definitions of development. Analysts  transfers because it is directly involved in decisionmaking
who emphasize income or production  as indicators of  about public investment and federal participation.
development may focus on macroeconomics or sectors.  Figures on fiscal transfers suggest that the government
Other analysts may focus on distribution and social  favored agricultural states in the quarter century studied.
aspects as development. Economists tend to see  *  Fiscal trarsfers  dominated financial transfers -
development strategy from the normative, technocratic  hence the general transfer from nonagricultural states to
perspective of welfare economics. Political scientists may  agricultural states. The Mexican government maintained
see development as a process of political interaction  a strong interventionist stance toward the rural and
between different interests.  agricultural sector even as it espoused reducing the
Using Mexico as a case, Yanagihara and Hisamatsu  government's  role in economic management.
examine macroeconomic conditions and policies (based  *  During the era of shared development, the
on flow of funds tables) and estimates of resource  government favored less productive agricultural states
transfers between sectors and regions, to relate them to  over highly productive agricultural states. As agrarian
development strategies. They find that:  reform was reformed, this favoritism diminished and
* Macroeconomic conditions and policies have  eventually disappeared.
exerted a strong impact on resource transfers between  *  The study results reflect the Mexican government's
the productive sector and the financial and fiscal sectors.  political inclinaiion to favor agricultural or rural states in
- Because of the strong impact of macroeconomic  coping with macroeconomic turmoil. In terms of
conditions and policies, resource transfers between  development str  ategy, the federal government may have
productive sectors were not necessarily evident for either  maintained that preference in securing resource flows,
financial or fiscal transfers. But combined transfers from  but that focus oni  the subsistence sector seems to have
nonagricultural states to agricultural states were  diminished recently.
significant in three out of four periods examined.
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\~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.  Introduction
Development  strategy  is discussed  in a number of different  ways. First of all, there are diverse
,views  and positions  with regard  to the very definition  of development.  Some  emphasize  economic  aspects
taking income  or production  as central indicators  of development.  In doing so focus might be placed on
the macro  or sectoral  level. Others pay more attention  to distributional  or social  aspects  pointing  to them
aLs  ultimate goals of development.  Secondly,  strategy is  discussed in  different manners. Typically,
economists  take a welfare economics  view and see development  strategy in a normative, technocratic
perspective.  Political  scientists,  in contrast,  tend to interprete  it as a summarizing  device  in the process  of
political  interactions  and aggregation  of diverse  interests.
Mexico offers  an important case for the examination of development  strategy. It has a political
system that  apparently allows one to  view development strategy from a  normative, technocratic
perspective.  Discourse on development  and development  strategy reflects diverse approaches and the
dominant  views  have shifted  over time. More importantly,  its development  records  have shown  a number
of contrasts  both across time periods and across  productive  sectors  or regions. It might be arguably  the
case that Mexico  represents  an ideal-type  case  for the study  of the sequence  of development  strategies.  It is
a challenge to conceptualize  and identify characteristic  features of Mexico's development  strategy and
relate them to developmental  performances.  Implications  and lessons could be of value for Mexican
policymakers  as well as those  from other  developing  countries.
In this paper we will review  and analyze  Mexican  experiences  placing analytical  foci on: (1) the
examination of macroeconomic  conditions  and policies based on the Flow of Funds tables; (2) the
estimation  of intersectoral/interregional  resource  transfers; and (3) the attempt at relating them to the
evaluation  of development  strategies  identified.  This choice of research  strategy is essentially  predicated
on the conimon  goal of the present collaborative  project  under the direction  of Prof. Teranishi. It is also
based  on our conviction  of the importance  of tracing  and accounting  for development  strategy  as actually
implemented  and reflected  in macro-level  flow  of funds and intersectoral/interregional  resource  transfers.
In reporting  the results  of our research,  this paper has the following  construction.
In Section 2 we will first trace Mexican  experiences  in economic  development  and present the
conventional  view of the sequence  of development  strategies  from around 1960  on. Secondly,  we will give
a brief chronology  of agricultural  sector  development  strategy.
In Section  3 we will discuss  the motivations  and methodologies  for the estimation  and examination
2of intersectoral  resource  flows in relation  to development  strategy.  First, we will review  various ways in
which development  strategies  are identified  and discussed.  Secondly,  we will try to clarify  the connection
between  various elements  of discourse  on development  strategy  and intersectoral  resource  flows. Thirdly,
we will review  the existing  works on intersectoral  resource  transfers.  Finally,  we will close  this section  by
defining our task based on the consideration of some of the characteristic  features of the Mexican
experiences  and the existing  works on intersectoral  resource  flows. We will also discuss  the availability
and limitation  of relevant  data.
In Section  4 we will present a brief overview  of macroeconomic  developments  from the perspective
of the financial  flows between  the private, public, financial  an(d  external sectors  as represented  in the
standard  Flow  of Funds (FoF)  tables. We will then discuss  their relations  to development  strategy.
In Section  5 we will present our tentative  results on the estimation  of intersectoralVinterregional
resource  transfers as captured  by utilizing state-level  fiscal and banking statistics.  We will then discuss
their relations  to development  strategy.
Brief  concluding  remarks  close  the paper.
2.  Mexico's  Development  Records  and Strategies
2.1. Overview:  Growth  and Poverty
Long-term  growth performance  of the Mexican  economy  since the 1940s can be summarized  as
follows  (Figure 1):
1. Growth  of the non-agriculture  sector  exhibits  a slow  upward  trend  between  1940  and 1965  and a
declining  trend thereafter;
2. Growth  of the agricultural  sector  shows  a persistent  downward  trend  from the 1950s  on;
3. Growth  rate differentials  between  non-agricuoture  and agriculture  clearly emerged in the late
1950s  and remained  significant  all through  the early 1980s.
4. In the 1990s  growth is slow  and unstable  both  for agriculture  and non-agriculture.
3Restoring  growth on a sustainable  basis remains a central task of development  strategy  for both
agricultural  and non-agricultural  sectors.
Mexico  also  faces  a serious  and persistent  problem  of poverty.  According  to a joint study  by INEGI
and CEPAL,  out of the total population  of 84.3 million in 1992, 37.2 million (44.1%)  lived below the
poverty  line and 13.6 million  (16.1%)  in extreme  poverty  (Table 1). Of the people in extreme poverty,  8.8
million live in nrral areas. This number  represents  25.6% of the rural population.  Extreme poverty in
rural areas is of endemic nature in that it is rooted in the lack of basic capabilities  to engage in more
p:roductive  economic  activities  or have  access  to alternative  income  opportunities.
2.2.  Development  Phases  and Strategies
Mexico  has gone through a number  of clearly  identifiable  phases of economic  management  in the
recent past. These phases are often identified with macroeconomic  policies and conditions. To use
conventional  labels for periodization:  the 1960s  was the period of "stabilizing  development"  (desarrollo
estabilizador)  characterized  by high and steady  rates of growth,  low rates of inflation  and stable  value of
currency;  the 1970s was characterized  by the pursuit of "shared development"  (desarrollo  compartido)
and by fiscal populism,  financed by oil exports and by external  borrowings,  which resulted in the debt
crises of the mid 1970s and early 1980s; and the 1980s and 1990s have turned out to be a prolonged
period of macroeconomic  stabilization  and structural  adjustment.  These developments  make it imperative
to pay due attention  to macroeconomic  conditions  and policies  in discussing  development  policies.
At the level of broad productive  sectors  the three phases identified  above  roughly  correspond  to the
following  sequences  of sectoral  developments.
In industry,  the first phase  was characterized  by sustained  high rates  of growth  based on expanding
domestic  demands in consumer  goods  and import substitution  in some intermediate  products;  the second
phase saw conscious  efforts  to deepen  industrial  composition  through backward  linkages  and capital goods
procurement  on the strength  of public  investment  expenditures;  and the third phase witnessed  a complete
balt in growth and a drastic policy  shift to trade liberalization  and export promotion  as reflected  in and
institutionalized  by the accession  to WTO  and NAFTA.
In agriculture,  the first phase was characterized  by the growth of the capitalist  subsector  and the
stagnation  of the subsistence  subsector;  the second  phase saw the continuation  of the divergent  trend of
the previous  phase and faced an abnupt  negative  turn in the supply-demand  balance in basic grains (i.e.
4maize and wheat).  The third phase was marked  by overall stagnation  of the sector and a historic policy
shift toward  market-oriented  agriculture  ( "reform  of the agrarian  reform").
As briefly reviewed  above,  one can surmise  main orientations  of development  strategy  for each of
the three phases. During the first phase, private investment was promoted both in industry and the
commercial  subsector  of agriculture  while the public sector financial  balance was kept in check. In the
second phase, government intervened more actively to  prornote import substitution and  industrial
deepening  and also to address the increasingly  serious  problem  of rural poverty  and subsequently  of food
shortage.  The third phase is characterized  as a shift toward  a new development  model  based on market-
mediated  resource allocation  in the context of opening and liberalization  amid continued  efforts  toward
macroeconomic  stabilization.
The nature of development  strategy  in Mexico  changed  drastically  over the past three decades.  In
the 1960s  and 70s development  strategy  was mostly  captured  in terms of providing  resources  for certain
sectors.  Productive  sectors  received  higher output  prices via protection  and price support  and lower input
prices via subsidies.  Finance was often earmarked  and subsidized. Similar approach was taken for the
maintenance  of the standard  of living: wages  were protected  and key consumption  items  were subsidized;
infrastructure  was provided  to satisfy  needs  of the population  in certain  location.
The 1960s saw a continuation  of economic  development  strategy  based on state support to private
business  and expansion  of the parastatal  sector and also a return of social  considerations  as indicated  by
increased  pace of redistribution  of agrarian land. This simultaneous  pursuit of economic  and social  goals
was carried out, however,  within the overall  framework  of economic  management  initiated in the mid
1950s, which subsequently  came to be called "stabilizing development".  In the domain of political
economy  "[SItability  for economic  growth was also provided  by tacit pacts which the Official  Party had
begun  to make with an increasing  number  of socioeconomic  sectors  beginning  in the late 1930s"  (Wilkie
(1990),  p.2)
The 1960s  ended in a political turmoil as a student-led  protest in the fall of 1968 resulted in a
violent  crackdown  by the government  and subsequent  emergence  cf guerrilla  movements.  Assuming  office
in 1970,  President  Echeverria  sought  to find a solution  to this political  problem  by expanding  tacit pacts,
i.e., by aiming at  improving income distribution and  coopting young critics through public sector
patronage.  These  policy  orientations  were pursued  by means  of expansionary  fiscal and monetary  policies,
breaking with  the  conservative tradition of  "stabilizing development". By  1976, macroeconomic
imbalance  became unsustainable  and the peso underwent a  maxidevaluation.  Under President L6pez
Portillo (1976-82)  Mexico  started a stabilization  program  to restore macroeconomic  balance  supported  by
an Extended Fund Facility accord with IMF. This program was soon aborted, however, as Mexico
5emerged as a  major exporter of oil and  thus regained its international creditworthiness.  Mexican
government  expanded  its economic  role significantly  as it embarked  on state-led programs  of industrial
development  and food self-sufficiency.  In  April 1980, under the L6pez Portillo administration, the
government  published  a National  Development  Plan (Plan Global)  covering  the period 1980-82.  The plan
postulated as  the  central goals of development strategy the  following macroeconomic  objectives:
maintaining  a high growth rate;increasing  employment;  satisfying  the basic needs of the population;  and
irnproving  regional  and family  distribution  of income. Social  policies  were closely  linked  to employment
and regional development  objectives  and were to be implemented  in coordination  with the ongoing  Rural
Development  Investment  Program (PIDER)  and the Plan for Marginal Areas (COPLAMAR).  The public
investment  program was to give priority to the social sector, agriculture  and basic transportation.  This
expansionary  policy  produced a temporary period of high growth but ended in another crisis in 1982
engendered  by rapidly  expanded  public  sector  deficits.
After the economic  crisis of the early 1980s,  development  came to be viewed  as collorary  to the
immediate task of macroeconomic  stabilization  and structural  adjustment. The new thinking was that
development  would follow in the successful  completion  of macroeconomic  stabilization  and structural
adjustment. Macroeconomic  stabilization would remove a  major source of uncertainty for  private
investors.  Structural adjustment  would eliminate distortions  in the incentive structure and open up an
array of new investment  opportunities  in accordance  with comparative  advantage  of the economy.  It will
also realize  conditions  in which  factors of production  are allocated  in response  to market-determined  rates
of return. At the same time, more  effective  targetting  is sought in directing  fiscal and financial resources
fcr the alleviation  of poverty.
The de la Madrid Administration  (1982-88)  faced an extremely  difficult task of macroeconomic
stabilization  under what might be called systemic  uncertainties  in the handling of external debt and
internal stagflation.  Restructuring  the whole  system  of economic  management  and responding  to changes
in  social and political conditions  was the central task for the government. Long-term development
concerns had to recede  to the backstage  and could only be addressed as implications of the short-term
necessity of reducing  the size of the public sector and improving  the external balance. In view of the
overriding demands of short-term macroeconomic  management,  it is remarkable  that the government
succeeded  in initiating and sustaining reform programs for liberalization of international trade and
deregulation  of domestic  economic  activities.  These reforms were presented as necessary  measures to
eliminate  distortions  created  under the previous  policy  regime  of import-substituting  industrialization  and
to redirect  the economy  toward  a new model  of export-oriented  development.  The turning point was July
:1985  when the government  decided  to initiate  a program  of import liberalization.  The comnmitment  to the
new trade regime was confirmed  by the decision  to accelerate  the pace of import liberalization  when
6Mexico faced a  renewed balance-of-payment  crisis in the wake of the collapse of the international
petroleum  market  in 1986.
The Salinas administration  (1988-94) approached  the lask of macroeconomic  stabilization  and
structural adjustment in a  resolute and systematic manner. Mdacroeconomic  management during the
Salinas Administration  was mostly focused  on the interrelated goals of the control of inflation and the
elimination  of the public  sector  deficit,  andthe successful  application  of the Brady  accord  further alleviated
the debt-servicing  burden and the inflow  of foreign funds gracdually  resumed.  Inflation, which reached
three digit levels in 1987  and 88 came down rapidly in 1989  and was in the single digit ranges in 1993
and 94.The public sector deficit was reduced rapidly and by  1991 the public sector was in surplus.
Structural reforms were deepened  as well as broadened under the general goal of "modernization".
Reform  in external  trade was locked  into GATT  and NAFTA  accords.  Deregulation  and privatization  was
carried out in a wide range of areas including  finance, agriculture, social sectors and  labor market.
Poverty  alleviation  and regional  development  was accorded  renewed  emphasis  in the Solidarity  Program
(PRONASOL).
The brief chronology  of economic  management  since  the 1960s  given above  may be summarized  in
the following  propositions  on the relation between  development  strategy and resource transfer. In the
1960s development  strategy in effect consisted of a  combination of preference schemes for private
businesses,  provision  of fiscal and financial  resources  to them, and expansion  of parastatal enterprises.  In
the 1970s  the new emphasis  on social  goals of income distribution  and poverty  alleviation  was added to
the previous  list, with more fiscal and financial resources  directed to the rural poor. In the 1980s, in
contrast, development  strategy  came to be discussed  in relation to the need for policy and institutional
reform designed  to change incentive  frameworks  of the economy.  Fiscal resources  were to be directed  to
strictly limited public goods such as infrastructure  and social services. Financial resources  were to be
allocated according to efficiency  criteria as realized through liberalization  of the financial sector. In
reality, however,  fiscal and financial mechanisms continued ta  be subjected  to short-term needs of
macroeconomic  management  and did not provide  adequate  condiltions  for the growth  of the real sector of
the economy.
72.3. Strategy  for Agricultural/Rural  Development'
Agricultural  sector  and rural areas  are important  considerations  in the overall  development  strategy
in relation  to growth and in particular  to poverty  alleviation.
In Mexico  development  strategy  has aimed at the simultaneous  realization of goals of industrial
expansion  and the miaintenance  of income for agricultural  producers.  The key variables in this set of
simultaneous  equations  were the consumer  and producer  prices of basic food items such as maize, beans
and sugar.The  desired policy  goals were to keep the consumer  prices low and the producer  prices high.
These  goals were mainly  pursued  through  the operation  of CONASUPO  established  in 1961.
The government set both consumer and producer prices for  major agricultural products and
financed  the deficits incurred  by CONASUPO.  This scheme  of global  food subsidies  (i.e., available  to all
consumers)  became particularly  significant  during the early 1980s, with the total amount of subsidies
reaching  1%  of GDP  by 1983.  Facing a serious  need  for drastic fiscal adjsutment  the government  decided
to phase out the global  subsidies  scheme  thereby  putting an end to one critical  aspect of the development
strategy  followed  since  the 1960s.  Another  aspect  of policy  toward  the agricultural  sector  was subsidies  on
agricultural  inputs such as fertilizer,  fuel, water, credit and crop insurance.  This was another significant
source  of fiscal  deficits  and would  come  to be similarly  slated  for a phase-out.
The 1960s saw the  establishment  of the policy and  instituional scheme for  industrial and
agricultural  development.  Policy  measures  favorable  for industrial  development  were introduced  one after
anohter; at the same time, compensatory  measures based on fiscal subsidies were instituted to help
alleviate  some of the adverse  impacts  of industrial  development  policies.
One of the central  components  of support  policy  for the agricultural  sector  was public  investment  in
irrigation  and other  forms. During the 1960s  the government  also  established  public  enterprises  supplying
agricultural inputs including fertilizer (FERTIMEX)  and seed (PRONASE).  They provided inputs at
subsidized  prices. Between  1958  and 1972 the ratio of output to input prices for agriculture  recorded  an
increase  thanks to input subsidies  although  agricultural  prices followed  a downward  trend in relation to
the general  price level.
Subsidies  on official  rural credits amounted  to 40 to 60% of the value of the loans, or 9% of the
The description  of thie section  is based on various World  Bank project  reports.
8sectoral GDP. Public expenditures  on the maintenance  and mEnagement  of irrigation systems  and other
facilities  amounted  to 6%, and the subsidies  on inputs equaled  5% of the agricultural  output.  Put together,
the subsidies  for agricultural  production  amounted to the peak level of around 30% of the agricultural
GDP in 1981-82.
The question  needs to be posed: Was this strategy  of counteracting  anti-agricultural  bias through
subsidization  effective  or efficient?
In addressing  this question one needs  to pay attention  to the internal structure  of the agricultural
sector. In 1950, the half of the number of agricultural units covering  the lower levels of production
accounted  for 6% of the total production.  In 1960,  this ratio war 4%. In 1970,  it reached  as low  as almost
2%. Virtually  all the benefits  of fiscal subsidies  were received  by commercial  fanners. On the other hand,
the large majority  of small producers  did not benefit  from none of those measures;  thus, they faced only
the adverse impacts of the macro and industrial policies. This lopsided incidence of the benefits of
governmental support for  agriculttire is  likely to  be  an  important factor behind the  increasing
miarginalization  of the small  producers  observed  over the 1950s and 60s. Rainfed  agriculture,  accounting
for two  thirds of cultivated  land, received  only  about 10%  of public  expenditures  in the agricultural  sector
up to mid 1970s.  The main product  for small producers  is maize. The ratio of the price of maize to the
minimum  wage exhibited  a strong  downward  trend between  1958 and 1973,  prompting  small farmers  to
seek  wage labor  opportunities.
During the period 1971-1981,  encompassing  the two presidential terms characterized  by state
activism, the role of state in agricultural sector was further expanded with more conscious attention
directed  to the support  for the traditional  producers.
The first conscious application of technocratic approach to  sectoral development  strategy for
agriculture  took  place under the Echeverria  Administration  that started in December  1971.  Guidelines  for
Economic  and Social  Policy  for the Agricultural  Sector [Lineamientos  de la Politica  Economica  y Social
del Sector  Agropecuariol  was issued  by the Ministry  of Presidency  in 1973.  One of the principal  authors
of this document  was Leopoldo  Solis.  Let us summarize  the key messages  of the document.
The document observes  with concern the loss of dynamisni in the agricultural sector since the
1960s  as manifested  in the slowdown  in production  and employrment  as well as in the worsening  of trade
balance  and also  pays attention  to "the  emergence  of problems  that had remained  hidden  during  the period
of agricultural expansion, connected  with the uneven pattern of development  of the sector". It  then
determines  that "the main focus  of the new agricultural  development  strategy"  be placed on "the solution
of two sets of related problems: how to  restore dynamism te  the sector, and how to wipe out the
9inequalities in income distribution that have arisen within it". Moreover these two problems are viewed as
interrelated in that  "[T]he decline in agricultural  production has affected subsistence farmers more than
commercial farmers, since the  slowdown in the expansion of cultivated  land has been  more marked in
non-irrigated areas".
Four  objectives of the  development strategy are  established. They are: employment, output,  net
foreign exchange earnings, and an adequate income for the least-favored stratum of the population. It is to
be noted that the goal of improvement of income distribution is sought "mainly through an increase in the
level of productive employment among smallholders and landless laborers". In achieving these objectives
a two-stage strategy is proposed, the first stage (1973-77) emphasizing  the expansion of the  area under
cultivation while the second stage (1978- ) placing more emphasis on increases in yields and  changes in
crop composition. Then issues in the following four areas are discussed in an attempt to identify principal
lines of new agricultural  policy: investment in physical resources; investment in human  resources; new
methods of organizing the production anid distribution  of inputs; and  new forms  of market organization
and new price policies.
Public expenditures in agriculture expanded rapidly during the presidency of Echeverria , with its
share in the total rising from 7% for  1970-71 to 15% for  1974-75. A  similar change took place in the
allocation of public investment.
In April 1980, the government published a National Development Plan (Plan Global) covering the
period  1980-82.  The  plan  postulated  as  the  central  goals  of  development  strategy  the  following
macroeconomic objectives: maintaining  a high growth  rate:increasing  employment; satisfying the basic
needs of the population; and improving regional and family distribution of income. Social policies were
closely linked to  employment and  regional development The  public  investment  program was  to  give
priority to the social sector, agriculture and basic transportation.
In mid 1980, under the L6pez Portillo administration,  the government launched a major program
called the Mexican Food System (SAM). Its main goals were achieving food self-sufficiency, meeting the
minimum  nutritional  needs of the poor  and  increasing  rural employment. These objectives were to be
implemented in coordination with the ongoing Rural Development Investment Program  (PIDER) and the
Plan for Marginal Areas (COPLAMAR). Its central strategic pillar consisted of a Basic Food Production
Program.  This  program  concentrated  on  rainfed  areas  with  small  irrigation  works.  It  consisted  of
technical assistance, provision of credit and insurance, and price support schemes. The prices of corn and
beans were to be increased by 30% and 50% in real terms between 1980 and 82.
The  Salinas  administration's  agricultural  strategy  was  outlined  in  the  National  Program  for
10Modernizing  the Countryside 1990-1994  (PMNC) published in early 1990. The main thrust of the
Program was to establish  a policy  and institutional  framework  for a market-based  agricultural  economy.
Thus the Program underlined the importance  of trade liberalization,  deregulation and privatization,
international  competitiveness,  and efficient  resource  allocation.  At the same time, however,  attention  was
paid to the heterogeneity  of the agricultural  sector, especially  in the reform of the rural credit schemes.
Also,  agricultural  sector  was completely  considered  in the NAFIA framework.
In sum, strategies  for agricutural/rural  development  have passed through three cleary identifiable
periods.  The first one is characterized  by the wide-spread  price support  and active public  expenditures;  the
second period by the strengthened  state involvement;  and the third one by the ongoing reduction  and
change in the role of the state.
3. Conceptual Issues,  Existing  Literature  and Research  Agenda
3.1. Development  Strategies,  Intersectoral  Balance  and Resource  Transfers
The central  task of our research  is to trace the evolution  and identify  the nature of development
strategy  in Mexico  since the 1960s to the early 90s, specially  focusing on agricultural  and rural sector.
Here development  strategy  is stipulated  to be concerned,  on the one hand, with the level of investment  and
its allocation  across  productive  sectors,  and on the other hand, wvith  securing  certain levels  of welfare  for
targeted  socio-economic  groups.
The level and allocation  of private investment  is construed  to be affected  by a relevant incentive
structure.  It will be reasonable  to assume that private investments  will be promoted  whenever  there are
prospects  for higher and more stable  rates of return. Financial  anid  fiscal preferences  constitute  one set of
incentives;  and protection  from imports and other forms of mitigating  market forces represent another.
Both of these measures  also facilitate investment on the side of internal financing insofar as retained
earnings represent an important component  of total funds to cover project costs. Besides, financial
preferences  have much to do with external financing  of the firms. More generally,  public  policy  on long-
term financial  facilities  will affect  the level and composition  of private investment.  These and whatever
other factors that affect expected  rates of return and net cash flows, as well as those impinging on the
amount and condition  of financing, will impact  on investment  decisions  of the private sector. As for the
public  sector's  part, in many cases government  goes beyond  its catalytic  role and takes  on a role of direct
11investor  and/or entrepreneur.  Development  strategy  thus encompasses  the level and composition  of public
expenditures  as additional set of instruments.  In relation to private  investment,  public expenditure  has
both supply-side  and demand-side  effects. On the supply side, better availability  of infrastructure  and
other  public  services  is expected  to raise  the rates of return of private  projects.  On the demand  side, public
sector purchases  will enhance  revenue  prospects  of some private  projects.  In relation  to the financing of
investment, however,  public sector might absorb funds that could have been used to finance private
investment.
Let us now turn our attention  to the other  goal of development  strategy,  i.e., securing  certain levels
of welfare  for targeted socio-economic  groups.  This second  goal will partly overlap with the first to the
extent that the increased  profitability  and expansion  of production  leads to higher incomes  of those who
supply  factors of production.  This harmonious  or trickle-down  scenario  might not be sufficient  or might
not work at all, however.  In some situations it might even be overwhelmed  by backwash effects, and
income opportunities  of many people  might be eroded.  The goal of securing  certain levels  of welfare  for
targeted socio-economic  groups may be approached  in two different  ways, one economic  and the other
social. The economic  approach  will address  the question  by trying to raise the earning capacity  of targeted
groups.  The social  approach  will take a more  direct route  and focus  on providing  income supplements  or
relevant goods and  services at subsidized prices to targeted groups. These two approaches are not
necessarily  contradictory  to each other and may  be usefully  combined  in some  cases.
To sum up the discussion  so far, development  strategy  is understood  to consist  of the weighting
between  the goals of investment  promotion  and increased  welfare  for some groups and also of the choice
of combination  of policy instruments.  Govermmental  decisions  on goals and instruments  will determine
the incentive  structure  for private  decisionmakers  and will affect  income opportunities  and welfare  levels
of various  groups.
Concern  with "intersectoral  balance"  constitutes  one of the primary  motivations  for our research.  In
spite of its central importance  in the debate  over  development  strategy  this concept  is not well defined.  It
could relate to one or more  of the following  aspects  of economic  life. First, it might refer to incidence  of
investment  opportunities  and allocation  of investible  funds. Second,  it may refer to the standard of living
of various socio-economic  groups. Third and more fundamentally,  it may refer to the capability to
participate  in economic  activities  on the part of individuals  and socio-economic  groups.
"Resource  transfers"  could  be related  to any of the concerns  with intersectoral  balance  as discussed
above. Thus, it might be linked to financing of investment, living standard, and/or participation  in
economic  activities.  It might  be reasonable  to assume  that, other  things being equal,  the larger  the market-
based resource  transfer  to one sector,  the better the conditions  of that sector  in all the three aspects.  But, at
12the same time, we have counteractive  resource  transfer  based on the public initiative.  For example,  with
regard to the third aspect, it might be argued that governmental  initiatives  to strengthen  a certain sector's
capability  to engage  in economic  life would  be reflected  in larger (fiscal)  resource  transfers  to that sector.
It should  be noted,  however,  that all the above  discussion  relate to ex-ante  intentions  and designs.  It is not
obvious  how and to what extent ex-ante decisions  and actions will be realized  as or reflected  in ex-post
resource  flows into designated  sectors.  It will be useful to distinguish  carefully these three aspects and
identify  impacts  on particular  forms  of resource  transfer  accordingly  in interpreting  actual resource  flows.
There is another important conceptual  clarification  to make. The concept of "resource  transfer"
could only  be understood  properly  when it is related  to a specific  accounting  and/or analytical  framework.
In the existing  literature,  it is used in the context  of two  different  frameworks.
First, the concept is used to refer to "actual resource  flows"  related to a certain sector (Ishikawa
(1988), Teranishi (1976, 1977), Ueno and Teranishi (1974)). One typical approach based on  this
definition  will be the estimation  of the "current  account  balance' ("balance  on goods,  services  and factor
incomes"  to be exact)  for the sector. This concept of sectoral "current account  balance" is analogous  to
that in the conventional  international  balance of payments. And similarly to the case of a  national
economy,  sectoral "current  account balance"  is identifiable  with the difference  between  realized savings
and investment  of the sector. It is to be remembered  that the actual resource  flows could be estimated
either on the side of the "current  account  balance"  (i.e., goods,  services  and factor  incomes)  or on the side
of the "capital  and transfer  balance",  which  consists  of (1) financial  flows to and from the financial  sector;
(2) tax payments  to and subsidy  receipts  from the government  sector;  and (3) private  transfer  payments  to
and receipts  from other  sectors.  We will refer to this accounting  framework  in what follows.  (Figure  2)
Secondly,  the concept of resource  transfers is used in a totally different analytical  setting, i.e.,
counterfactual  simulation  (Krueger,  Schiff,  and Valdes  (1991)).  What is presented  as resource  transfer (or
more  properly  "income  transfer")  in that analytical  framework  is tlhe  difference  between  the actual level of
income for a certain group and a hypothetical  level estimated  under a counterfactual  set of parameter
values. This difference  is interpreted  to signify  "implicit  resource  transfers" to a sector generated  by the
presence  of the actual set of parameters.  This type  of exercise  is often  carried out contrasting  a distorted
(actual) situation  with a distortion-free  (counterfactual)  situation  with a view to assessing  quantitatively
distributive  impacts of sectoral and macroeconomic  policies.  It should be noted that "implicit resource
transfers" thus estimated  logically  correspond  to some items in the actual resource  flows (or the "current
account balance" as defined above) , as they affect the magnitude of some components  of revenue or
expenditure,  although the actual balance will also reflect whatever secondary  effects of those implicit
transfers.
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the "capital  and transfer  balance".  The balance  consists  of all the monetary  and financial  flows that do not
have  corresponding  entries in the "current  account"  (or, to be exact, "goods,  services  and factor incomes
account").  Specifically  it comprises  (1) financial  flows to and from the financial  sector; (2) tax payments
to and subsidy  receipts  from the government  sector;  and (3) private  transfer  payments  to and receipts  from
other  sectors,  as discussed  above.
Public expenditures  pose a minor conceptual  problem. Certainly  they do not have corresponding
entries in expenditure  items in the "current  account".  But then they do not generate actual monetary  or
financial flows either. In  relation to the  accounting framework adopted here, public expenditures
constitute "official  transfers" and could be added to both the "current account" and the "capital and
transfer  account"  to produce a broader  concept  of resource  transfers.  It is to be noted that this broadened
concept of resource  transfers  is premised on the presumption  that the sector's  economic  agents evaluate
the public  services  as equal to the expenditures  made  by the public  sector.
In this section,  we have identified  two combined  goals of development  strategy,  their relations to
the intersectoral  balance,  and various  conceptual  issues  regarding  the "resource  transfer"  between.  sectors.
3.2. Existing  Literature  on Intersectoral  Resource  Flows  in Mexico
To the best of our knowledge,  the first study  on intersectoral  transfer was done by Leopoldo  Solis
(Solis  (1967)).  The research  program  of Solis  was to examine  whether  agriculture  provided  resource  to the
rest of the economy  for investment  between 1942 and  1962, and if so, how important it was for the
investment of the rest of the economy.  Behind this research interest of his was a  hypothesis that
agriculture is the source of capital for the industrialization.  Solis calculated  and estimated resource
transfer  via banking system  and via fiscal mechanism  between  agriculture  and the rest of the economy.
His finding was that there was resource  flow from agriculture  to the rest of the economy  via banking
system, but that resource  flow via fiscal mechanism  was in the opposite direction and larger than the
former. Therefore,  he concluded that for Mexican economic  development  of the period 1942-62, the
hypothetical  role of agriculture  as capital  source  for the rest of the economy  had to be denied.
After the pioneering  work by Solis, there have been a number of studies such as Reyes Osorio
(1974) and G6mez-Oliver  (1978) on the intersectoral transfer issue. Luis G6mez-Oliver  investigated
extensively  on this subject when he coordinated  a part of a  large-scale  joint study between  Mexico's
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(1984, 1990)). He followed the same method as Sotis's regarding the banking sector and the fiscal
mechanism  but also introduced  relative  price effects  as well as govermment  price regulation  and subsidies
as new components  in the intersectoral  transfer. He calculated  resource  transfer via changes in relative
prices  between  agriculture  and the rest of the economy  on the basis of an arbitrarily  selected  base year and
using sectoral  GDP deflators  as price indices.  Additionally,  he calculated  fiscal effect  of price regulation
and subsidies.  Then, he summed  up all the transfer components  to calculate  a consolidated  intersectoral
transfer  flow.  He argued  that three periods  could  be notable  between  1940  and 1987.  As for the first period
(1940-1969),  he found that agriculture transferred  a significant amount of resource to the rest of the
economy.  The difference  between Solis's observation  and his could be attributed to the fact that he
included  the relative  price effect.  As for the second  period (1970-1979),  he found that the net transfer  was
to the agriculture  sector, again thanks to the relative  price effect.  As for the third period (1981-1987),  he
found  a massive  transfer  from agriculture  to the rest of the economny.
G6mez-Oliver  had an objective  of investigating impacts of policies on income distribution  in
studying intersectoral  transfer. Certainly,  it was reasonable  that he tried to consider the relative  price
effect  in the sense that income transfer relative  to a counterfactual  situation could be estimated,  but his
method of simply summing up all the numbers  was wrong as we argued in the section on conceptual
clarification.  Two transfer numbers calculated  from an accounting identity  (actual fiscal and financial
transfers) could not be  added up  to  a  number based on  counterfactual  simulation (hypothetically
constructed  relative  priee effect)  without  certain  explicit  assumptions.
There is another line of research  which shares  interest in sectoral  balance  with our approach. So
called "Urban Bias" approach focuses  on balance or imbalance of inter-sectoral  resource  allocation of
social  and infrastructure  spending  between  rural and urban areas. Aspe  and Baristain (1984) studied  the
regional distribution  of government  resources  for health and education,  and found the contrast between
increase  of overall  spending  for education  on the one hand, and clecreasing  share allocated  to elementary
education  in rural areas  on the other  hand.
Though two approaches above mentioned share  common interest in  allocation of  public
expenditures  between agriculturalJrural  areas and non-agricultural/urban  areas, there is one important
difference  in government  role. While intersectoral  resource  transfer  approach  focuses  on flow of investible
funds, urban bias approach  focuses  on allocation  of public goods. In other words, the former approach
tends to consider  government  as fiscal mechanism  of redistribution  and/or setter  of incentive mechanism,
while the latter approach  considers  govermnent  as producer  and supplier  of public  goods.
In this section,  we have surveyed  the existing literature  of intersectoral  resouce  flows in Mexico.
15None of the  existing studies on this  theme attempted  an  empirical treatment of the  dualistic nature  of
Mexican agricculture.
3.3. Research Agenda
This paper  tries to trace  and  evaluate development strategy in Mexico from  the perspectives  of
macroeconomic  management  and  of  intersectoralVinterregional resource  transfer.  First,  given  the
macroeconomic turmoil of 80-90s, we trace salient changes in macroeconomic balances utilizing the Flow
of Funds tables. Secondly, we estimate intersectoralVinterregional  resource transfers by utilizing state-wise
data on federal government revenues and expenditures as well as state-wise data on deposits and credits of
commercial banks.
The methodology adopted here  has  a number of advantages  over that  adopted in  earlier studies
aimed at estimating resource flows across productive sectors. First, it allows explicit discussion of links
between macroeconomic management and resource allocation. Second, it can circumvent the difficulty of
assigning public expenditures and  revenues as well as banking deposits and  loans to productive sectors.
Third, our approach allows one to estimate net resource flows to the subsectors within agriculture (labeled
as  High-Productivity AGRO and  Low-Productivity AGRO). Fourth,  state-wise data  provides  not only
approximations  to sector-wise disagregation  of resource flows but  allows one  to capture  interregional
resource flows, an important developmental perspective in its own right.
Our methodology, however, faces a  number of limitations and  problems, some possibly serious.
First, there are some unresolved conceptual and theoretical issues. While the concept of financial transfer
is clear and unambiguous, that of fiscal transfer leaves room for alternative definitions and interpretations.
The cause of this ambiguity lies in the definition of what is fiscal or public and also in the determination
of what constitutes resource transfers. For example, it is not clear whether public expenditures should be
regarded as resource transfers from the public sector to the private sector. And even if the answer to that
question is affirmative, it is open to question whether expenditures should be valued at actual amounts of
payment. Secondly, there are theoretical  issues. We have not fully identified the channels through which
various policy measures impact on fiscal and financial transfers. Therefore, we will not be able to separate
out  the  influences  of policies  from  those  of  other factors  in a  formal  manner.  Thirdly,  there  is the
limitation of data availability/accessibility. With regard to financial  transfer, we do not have state-wise
breakdown of loans by development banks. Our estiamtes of financial transfer have a downward bias due
to this omission. In relation to fiscal tansfer, our estimates fail to capture current expenditures of federal
16government  while they include  investments  by public enterprises.  Besides  the above-mentioned  problems,
there could be criticism  agianst our premise of identifying  geographical  units (i.e.,states)  with particular
productive  activities.  This  is the central premise  of our empirical  approach  to intersectoral  resource  flows
but, obviously,  it is nothing more than an approximation.  But, as stated above, interregional resource
flows might  be of interest  in their own right.
Exanmnationof  flow of investible  funds across  regions  has not been undertaken  so far as we know.
One of the purposes of our research  is to explore what patterns emerge from the estiamnted  fiscal and
financial flows across states and  groups of states characterized by their productive characteristics.
Interpretation  of those patters as resource  flows across  productive  sectors  might be problematic  and will
need to be supported  by relevant  sector-wise  information.
4.  Results  of Empirical  Research
4.1. Macroeconomic  Management  and Development  Strategy
The sequence  of macroeconomic  balances  is captured  in Table  2 and Figure  3.
Macroeconomic  management  throughout the "stabilizing  development"  period was characterized
by modest  levels of the public sector deficit as well as the external deficit (Table 2). This reflected  the
institutional power of the Treasury Department in economic management. As discussed above, the
Echeverria  Administration  changed  the basic tone of economic  management  toward  activist state role in
economic  development  disregarding the requirements  of sound macroeconomic  management. Another
feature  observed  in Table 2 is that when the public  sector showed  deficits,  they were covered  by surpluses
of the private  sector. It is true that certain portions of those deficits were covered  by the external sector.
But, siginificant  portion of resources were proffered from the private sector. This feature was very
remarkable  in the more recent  periods,  too, and we can say that in this accounting  sense macroeconomic
17situation  is very  important  for overall  flow  of funds, 2 In what follows  we will use the Flow  of Funds tables
compiled  by the Banco de Mexico  to characterize  the pattern  of macroeconomic  balances  over the period
1976-95,  i.e., the latter half of the "macroeconomic  populism"  phase and the whole of the "stabilization
and structural  adjustment"  phase (Figure  3). We can identify  three periods  corresponding  to each six-year
presidential  term of L6pez  Portillo  (1976-82),  de la Madrid (1982-88)  and Salinas  (1988-94).
During the L6pez  Portillo  Administration  (1976-82),  the public  sector deficit initially came down
from 9% (of GDP)  to around 6% but shot up to around 15% in 1981 and 82. The private sector surplus
followed  a similar movement.  The gap between  the public  sector  deficit  and the private  sector surplus,  i.e.
the external deficit,  initially shrank from 4% to 2% but subsequently  expanded  to exceed  5% in 1981.  In
1982, the external deficit had to be abruptly  elimninated  in the wake of the halt of the inflow of new
money.
Macroeconomic  situations  during the de la Madrid Administration  (1982-88)  were nothing short of
dramatic  and traumatic.  The public sector  deficit initially came down from 17% in 1982  to 6% in 1984
but shot  up again to exceed  15%  in 1986  and 87. The private  sector surplus  followed  a similar  movement,
but at a slightly  higher level on the whole.  The external  balance  was in surplus  for most  of the years while
a series of debt reschedulings  alleviated  crisis situations in the balance of payments . This was also a
period of high and volatile  inflation  with annual rate varying  from the initial high of 100% in 1982  to a
temporary  trough  of 60% in 1984  to their historical  record  high of 160%  in 1987  and eventually  to 50% in
1988.
Macroeconomic  management  during the Salinas  Administration  (1988-94)  was mostly  focused  on
the interrelated  goals of the control of inflation and the elimination of the public sector deficit, as the
successful  application  of the Brady accord  further alleviated  the debt-servicing  burden and the inflow of
foreign funds gradually  resumed.  The public  sector deficit  was reduced  rapidly and by 1991 the public
sector  was in surplus.  The private sector  balance  followed  a similar  movement  but in an even more  drastic
manner, swinging from a surplus of 17% in 1987 to a deficit of 14% in 1992. The external balance
recorded  continuously  expanding  deficits,  from 1.5%  in 1988  to nearly  8% in 1994.
As noted above,  the main feature of Figure 3 is "synchronized"  movements  of the public sector
balance  and the private  sector  balance.  An interesting  question  we will address  in the next section  will be:
how macroeconomic  balances  are reflected  in the flow of investible  funds across productive  sectors  or
2 We are certainly  aware that this is significantly  affected  by inflation.  But, again we would like  to
emphasize  that inflation  itself  is the result of macroeconomic  situations.
18across  regions.
4.2. Intersectoral/Interregional  Resource  Transfer:  Resource  Flow  lo Targeted  Sector
4.2.1. Methodological  Notes
In this section,  we will discuss  the methodology  adopted  in estimating  intersectoral  resource  flows
over the three decades  and present tentative results. We will then try to relate them to the sequence  of
development  strategy.
In general, economic  development  of a country may be viewed as a process in which various
interactions  between sectors  take place. Sectors may be defined in a number of alternative ways. One
typical way is to aggregate economic  activities according to physical/technical  nature of products or
productive  processes.  From this perspective  a  national economy is often divided into the agricultural
sector on the one hand and the industrial  and service  sector (or the non-agricultunal  sector)  on the other.
Based  on that same perspective,  however,  an economy  might be disaggregated  in a different  manner,  for
example, into the leading sector and the decaying sector. Another definition of sectors is based on
locational  characteristics  of economic  agents and leads  to the disaggregation  of a national economy  into
geographical  units, as in the case  of the contrast  between  the rural sector  and the urban sector.
In this paper we will essentially  adopt the conceptual  distinction  between  the agricultural  sector
and the non-agricultural  sector  although  we will rely on regional  (state-level)  data in statistical  estimation.
That decision  was made in view of the common  framework  of this collaborative  research  project  and also
in view of a tradition in development  economics  in which most of discourse is couched in terms of
agriculture  vs. industry.  In Mexico,  both productive  and regional  sectorization  are employed  in discussing
development  strategy.  This is partly  due to the fact that the productive  sectors,  and the agriculture  sector
in particular,  exhibit  high degrees  of heterogeneity  within  them. Roughly  speaking,  each productive  sector
may be divided into the modem subsector  and the traditional subsector.  In the case of agriculture, this
distinction  largely  overlaps  with geographical  location,  with the northern part being more advanced  in
technology  and management  and the southern  part typically  more  stagnant. We  will utilize  regional  (state-
level)  data in our estimation  of resource  flows  to capture  this contrast  within the agricultural  sector that.
As discussed in the previous section we intend to relate our estimation of resource flows to
19development  strategy as actually implemented by the government. The two aspects of development
strategy mentioned  in the previous  section correspond  to the sectoral  divisions  only to a limited extent,
however. The promotion  of investment  may or may not be designed or carried out in broad sectoral
scopes.  In the Mexican  context,  the most relevant  distinction  from this perspective  might  be one between
the capitalist  sector and the subsistence  sector cutting across  productive  or regional groupings.  On the
other hand, the poverty  alleviation  aspect  of the development  strategy  may be broadly  identified  with the
rural sector  and the support  for traditional  agriculture.
In this paper, we utilize regional (state-level)  statistics  in estimating  intersectoral  resource  flows.
Specifically,  we classify  all the states initially into two categories,  the agricultural states and the non-
agricultural states. Then we classify the agricultural states into two subgroups,  i.e. the modern and
traditional agricultural states, on the basis of productivity  and irrigation characteristics  of individual
states. There are two major advantages  for this approach. First, there exists data on both loans and
deposits for conunercial banks dissagregated  by state for the period 1978 - 94. The existing studies
resorted to the estimation of agricultural deposits on the assumption  that the percentage of deposits
accounted  for by the agricultural  sector is equal to the share of agriculture  in GDP. Given that loan and
deposit data is available, we can directly calculate financial transfers. Second, we can reasonably
approximate  the dichotomy  in the agricultural  sector  by the two subgroups  within the agricultural  sector.
In the literature,  there have been numerous references  to the bi-modal  structure  of Mexican  agriculture.
But, as far as we know, there has been no attempt to have that characteristic  feature reflected in the
estimation  of resource  flows  in and out of the agricultural  sector  in Mexico.
We focus  on the federal  government  as the designer  and executor  of national development  strategy.
It  is important for us  to  make clear as to how we treat local governments (state and municipal
governments)  and public  organizations  and enterprises. We treat those public entities as constituents  of
the real economy  rather than as executors  of governmental  functions.  We have the following  reasons  for
this decision.  First, we are interested  in relating intersectoral/interregional  flows to development  strategy
at  the national level. Therefore, federal government is the only relevant decision-maker  from our
perspective.  Second, as for local governments  specifically,  the federal government  has maintained a
centralized system of control all  through the period we study in  this  paper. Third, as for public
organizations and  enterprises, we  have the  following reasonings. Most public organizations and
enterprises  are administered  by the federal  government  and therefore  it is presumed  that their behaviors
are essentially  determined  by the decisions  of the federal  government.  To the extent the functions  of the
parastatals are defined in terms of their interactions  with the private sector, they can be viewed  as an
extension of the federal govermnent. From a  different perspective,  however, public enterprises in
particular will be seen as constitute part of the productive  sector of the economy along with private
20enterprises. For the federal government  they will constitute  but one part of the productive sector and
targets of its development  policies.  Given  our interest in resource  flows between  productive  sectors,  it will
be more  appropriate  to treat  them separately  from the federal  govermnent  and instead group  them together
with private  entities.  Accordingly,  we separate  the rest of the economy  in two:  financial sector  on the one
hand, and combined  sector of productive  sector and state and municipal  government  on the hand.
There  are various  forms  of transaction  among  sectors.  We use only  two  means of trasaction  because
of limited availability  of the data: financial  transfer via commercial  banks and fiscal transfer  via federal
government.  We briefly  comment  other means  of transfers.
First, there is resource transfer  by way of selling and buying  of securities  (bonds and equities)  of
(private and public) corporate  sector. We have not used any information  on this transaction because  we
don't have information.  But, the effect of omission  might be smadl  given that in Mexico  major  financial
intermediation  occur through banking sector even though  there has been recently emerging  role of direct
finance.
Second,  we don't use any information  on resouce  transfer  via development  bank and non banking
financial institutions.  It is primarily  because  we don't have relevant data (credit  and liabilities  holding  by
state). Certainly  we have information  of credit provided  by development  bank by various types of sectors
which  includes  agriculture.  But, precisely  we have decided  not to use this type  of information  because  we
don't  have information  of bank liablities  holding  by sectors  either  ifor  commercial  bank or for development
bank.
Third, as for expenditure  side of fiscal transfer  via federal  government,  we only  use participation
data and public  investment  data. We should make some  commnents  on this. First of all, we have decided  to
use  this  only two specific data  because these are  the  ones only available information by  state
disaggregation.  Therefore, we underestimate  federal outflow of federal funds. Even though there are
current expenditures,  and subsidies and transfers which affect fiscal mechanism of transfer, we have
decided not to use this data because there is no available data by regional basis. Certainly there is
dissaggregation  by sector (e.g., agricultural  sector)  in federal  expenditure.  But, usually  this expenditure  is
total sum of expenditures  of federal  secretaries  in charge of agricultural  and rural sector. This budget is
not necessarily  transfered to  rural or agricultural sector because this budget is used for  rural and
agricultural  sector.  It meanss  that, for example,  building  construction  of office  use of agricultural  secretary
is categorized  in this agricultural  and rural sector. This money  is not used for transfer to agricultural  or
rural sector. Of course,  it does not mean that those rural expenditure  for building  is not for rural sector.
We don't want to count on rural service provision  from federal  government  but federal  fund provision  to
rural sector.
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domestic taxation  numbers  (tributario).  It  means we exclude taxation  of foreign trade  as  well as  non
taxation revenue (no tributario). We exclude foreign tariffs and export tax because we are concerned about
domestic resouce transfer of investible funds. We exclude non taxation revenue because major part of this
taxation comes from transfer of profit of public enterprise  (such as PEMEX). Since we don't know which
part of this profit transfer comes from each state, we have decided not to include non taxation revenue in
our estimation.
For financial data, we use regional (by state) deposit and  credit data of commercial bank  collected
by Banco de Mexico. It  appears in some issues of  INEGI's Anuario Estadistico and  some presidential
Informe de Gobiemo. We have checked that this covers all the governments and public and private sector.
Therefore, we have to exclude federal government's involvement in the data since we are concerned with
transfer between two productive sectors via financial  mechanism.  We have found that  credit data from
government  of District  Federal is almost equal to Federal Government's  credit data which  appears  in
Banxico's Informe Anual. So, we excluded credit to government from total credit for our use. On deposit
side, we have confinned that federal deposit is relatively small. Thus, we don't change deposit data.
For fiscal data, we use Informe de Gobierno, INEGI's Anuario Estadistico, INEGI's Ingreso y gasto
de finanzas publicas, INEGI's Ingreso y gasto de estados y municipales.
4.2.2. Approximation of Sectors by States
We use regional data,  specifically state level data, for our  resource transfer  study. There  are  32
states  (including  Federal  District)  in Mexico.  (Figure  4)  We  classify all  the  states  into  agricultural
(AGRO) states and  non-agricultural  (NON-AGRO) states. We use mainly two criteria  in classification:
percentages of agriculture in production and in employment. In other words, agriculture is a major activity
of production or a major source of employment in AGRO states, while non-agriculture is a major activity
or a major source of employment in NON-AGRO states. Additionally, we check urbanization rate, as it is
often taken  it for granted  in the literature  that  the agricultural  sector dominates economic activities in
rural areas in developing countries.
224.2.2.1. Criteria for  Classification
A number  of criteria are considered  to classify  states into two sectors.  Although  we learned from
the literature that there was a bias against agriculture  through Mexico's economic development  from
1960s,  we consider  entire  periods to classify  every state into one of two  categories.
Mexican  agriculture  has an interesting  feature  which makes  this intent of categorization  somewhat
difficult.  On the one hand, there is a mainly  private, highly  productive  sub-sector.  This sub-sector  mainly
produces  very competitive  and commercial  agricultural  products.  On the other hand, there is a mainly
community  based,  low  productivity  sub-sector.  This sub-sector  mainly  produces  basic  crops.
The first three criteria are used to classify  AGRO  states against NON-AGRO  states.
(1) Percentage  of agriculture  in Gross  State  Product  (GSP)  (Table  3)
This is one of the most important  criteria to classify  AGRC)  states. If the significant  portion  of the
state's  activity  is based on agriculture,  we can call it AGRO  state. B3ut,  Low  Productivity  (LP) AGRO  state
might  fall out precisely  because  of its low  productivity.
(2)  Percentage  of agriculture  in Economically  Active  Population  (EAP) (Table  4)
This ratio is also very important.  When the significant  portion of people in a state is engaged  in
agriculture,  we can call it AGRO  states.  But, High Productivity  (HIP)  AGRO  state might  fall out  because  of
its high labor  productivity.
(3) Urbanization  Ratio  (Table  5)
In general urban (or urbanization  ratio) is defined in proportion  of population  who lives in cities.
HP-AGRO  state might  be classified  as urban area because  of its high labor productivity.  This ratio shows
similar  trend  to agriculture  share in EAP.
Now,  we will consider  three criteria  to classify  High Productivity  AGRO  states (HP-AGRO)  against
Low Productivity  AGRO  (LP-AGRO)  states. (Table  6)
(4) Agricultural  Labor  Productivity  Ratio:  (Agriculture  in GSP)  / (Agricultural  in EAP)
This ratio focuses  on labor aspect  of productivity.  We use this ratio primarily  to classify  HP-AGRO
and LP-AGRO.
23(5) Agricultural  Land  Productivity  Ratio:  (Agriculture  in GSP)  / (Agricultural  Area)
This  ratio focuses on  land  aspect of productivity.  We consider this  ratio as  secondary in
classification  because  it is affected  largely  by product  choice.
(6) Agricultural  Irrigated  Land  Ratio:  (Irrigated  Land  Area) / (Non-irrigated  Land Area)
Irrigation is one major source of high productivity.  This ratio also focuses on  land aspect of
productivity.
4.2.2.2. Method of Classification
We classify  a certain  state as AGRO  state if it satisfies  one of the following  two  conditions:
(1) its agricultural  share in GSP is higher  than the median more  than 4 periods  (out of 6 periods);
(2) its agricultural  share in EAP is higher than the median  more  than 3 periods (out  of 4 periods).
Then we  classify all  the AGRO states into HP-AGRO and LP-AGRO using the following
condition:
(3) two of the three productivity  measures  (labor productivity,  land productivity,  and irrigation
ratio) are above  the national averages.
4.2.2.3. Results of Classifleation
Based  on (1) and (2), we classify  the following  states as AGRO  states:
BS, CA, CH, CS, CL, DF, GR,  HG, MI, NA, OA,  PU, QR, SI, SL, SO, TA, TX, VE, YU, ZA. (21
states)
Conversely,  the following  states  are classified  as NON-AGRO  states:
AG, BC, CO, DF, GT, JA, ME, MO,  NL, QT, TM (11 states)
24Then, based  on (3), the following  states are classified  as HP-AGRO  states:
BS, CH, CL, DG, NA, SI, SO (7 states)
Conversely,  the following  states  are classified  as LP-AGRO  states:
CA, CS, GR,  HG, MI, OA,  PU, QR, SL,  TA, TX, VE, Y1J,  ZA (14  states)
The result is presented  in Figure 5.
4.2.3.  Estimated  Resource  Transfers
4.2.3.1. Ftscal Transfer
Fiscal  transfer  (FisT)  for each state is defined  as follows:
FisT  = Federal  Participation  in State  and Municipalilies
+ Federal  Public  Investment
- Federal Taxation in State
Since we don't have taxation number  in state level for all the period, we estimate  the number. We
subtract foreign trade tax, and non-tax revenue  from total revenue  (almost equal to sum of direct and
indirect  tax). Then we multiply  this figure  by the proportion  of GSP of each state in total. Our underlying
assumption  is that taxation is proportional  to certain representative  figure of state income. We use Gross
State  Product  for this variable. 3 As we noted  before,  we use federal  public  investment  data which includes
not only investment by federal govemnment  budget but also investment by public organization and
enterprise.  At the revenue  side, we use only  federal  govermment  data. Our  justification  is that we consider
3 We checked  correlation  between  our estimated  taxation by state and reported  taxation revenue  by
state for 1985.  The correlation  ratio is 0.95.
25all the public  investment  as grant-in-aid.
The calculated  fiscal transfer numbers of each state is aggregated  according to the category of
AGRO  (HP-AGRO  and LP-AGRO)  states  and NON-AGRO  states (Table  7).
Several  cormments  on this table are as follows.  First, every column  is almost negligible  in 1970.  It
was the last year of "Stabilizing Development"  phase. As for 1975, there exists transfer from NON-
AGRO states to AGRO states. Second,  As for both 1970 and 1975, total amounts of transfer are very
small. But, from 1980 on, total amounts of transfer become large. This contrast is consistent with
Macroeconomic  populism of late 70s and turmoil and adjustment of 80s. Third, from 1980 on, the
numbers on difference  between total amount and investment  of public organization  and enterprise are
available. These numbers reflect how much federal government  bought goods and  services from
productive  sector.  It is stable  around  6-7 % of GDP.  Fourth, as for 1980,  all the numbers  on productive
sectors  and subsectors  are positive.  It means  that mainly  because  of initiatives  of public  organizations  and
enterprises,  there were large amount of financial inflow via fiscal mechanism.  It was consistent  with
macroeconomic  populism of late 70s.  Fifth and  finally, for  all  those periods, NON-AGRO states
contributed  more  or gained less  than AGRO  states.  This tendency  was consistent  with historical  initiative
of federal  government  to transfer  funds to AGRO  or rural states.
4.2.3.2. Financial  Transfer
Financial Transfer (FinT) is calculated according to the following formula:
FinT = Net Credit to the State - Net Deposit in the State.
The calculated  financial  transfer  numbers  of each state is aggregated  according  to the category  of
AGRO  (BP-AGRO  and LP-AGRO)  states and NON-AGRO  states (Table  8).
Several comments are in  order. First, it suffices to  say that macro financial picture is very
important.  The other components  of the balance sheet of the commercial  banks are affected by macro
situation.  Cash, reserve  at central  bank and securities  purchase  in the asset side and capital increase  in the
26liabilities  side is example.  Therefore,  there is not inter-sectoral  resource  transfer  except 1985. Second,  in
1980  all the numbers  are negative.  It means  that commercial  banks obtained  assets  other than credit. It is
consistent  with the notion that in this period  fiscal authorities obtained  finance through central  bank via
higher reserve  requirement.  Third, in 1985  there was  financial  transfer  from AGRO  states to NON-AGRO
states. Also this year was special in the sense that commercial  banks' credit to federal  government  was
huge. It was consistent  with nationalization  of commercial  baniks.  Fourth, as for both 1988 and 1993,
credit to government  was negative.  Also for those two years, adl the numbers  of transfer to productive
sectors  and subsectors  are positive.  It is consistent  with financial  deregulation  of commercial  banks. Fifth,
from 1985  on, commercial  banks' transfer  revealed  preferences  in the following  order: NON-AGRO,  HP-
AGRO, and LP-AGRO  states. It is consistent  with the so-called  preference to investment opportunity
perceived  by private  sector.
4.2.3.3. Combined Fiscal and Financial  Transfer
We combine  two  tables  to calculate  combined  transfer (Table  9).
Even though each period shows its unique feature, all the periods demonstrate one conunon
characteristics.  All through  the periods,  NON-AGRO  states  contributed  more  to funds inflow  than AGRO
states. In fact, except 1985,  which was adjustment  year, resource transfer  from AGRO states to NON-
AGRO  states occurred.  And there is a contrast  between  1980 and 1985 on regarding  comparison  of HP-
AGRO states and LP-AGRO  states. In 1980, LP-AGRO  states gained more resources  than HP-AGRO
states,  while from 1985  on, this situation  completely  reversed.  This might reflect  that in 1980  there was an
active policy initiative (e.g., SAM) towards rural sector, while from 1985 on, "reform of agricultural
reform"  based  on market  mechanism  has been in progress.
4.2.4.Fiscal  and Financial  Transfers  at State  Level
So  far we have examined  fiscal and financial  transfers  separately  and in an aggregated  manner. We
have been  concerned with the  relationship between the  composite resource transfer  and  sector
characteristics.  We classified  all the Mexican states into three groups  and used them to approximate
productive sectors in our examination of the flow of investiblJe  funds. These sectoral numbers are
27constructed  by summing up state-wise  data. It will be also interesting to look at those numbers for
individual  states. It will be also interesting  to look  at the relationship  between  the financial transfer and
the fiscal  transfer.
Looking at the contrast and interaction  between  the two transfers,  we can understand more the
relationship  between  the financial  transfer  mediated  by commercial  banks and the fiscal transfer  mediated
by federal  government.  We take the percentage  ratio of each transfer relative  to Gross State Product of
each state, because  we try to capture the importance  of those transfers  from the point of view of each state
economy.  Wehavefouryears: 1980,  1985, 1988,  and 1993.
The year 1980  was under Lopez  Portillo's  presidential  term. As we described  in the section  on flow
of funds, banks were privately  owned and government  intervention  was extensive  in the economy.  The
scatter  diagram  of the financial  and fiscal  transfers  for 1980  is presented  in Figure 6. The relationship  is
of a weak negative  correlation.  First of all, we can confirm  that this was a year of fiscal expansion.  Many
states received  heavy fiscal transfers.  The outlier of the fiscal transfer is a petroleum  state (Campeche),
where huge public investment  was made. No LP-AGRO  states have recorded  positive  financial  transfer,
and many NON-AGRO  states are located  in the lower  left part of the diagram.
The year 1983  shows  a weak negative  correlation,  too. (Figure  7) The commercial  banks had been
nationalized  and were forced to provide  credit to federal  government,  which was trying to achieve  fiscal
discipline.  No huge fiscal transfer  was observed  in contrast  to the situation  in 1980.  No LP-AGRO  states
showed  positive  financial  transfer this year as well as in 1980. No NON-AGRO  states showed  positive
fiscal  transfer.
The year 1988 neither  shows  a positive  nor negative correlation.  (Figure 8) In this year, financial
intermediation  by commercial  banks was so highly regulated  that deposits declined heavily. With the
change of administration, interest rates were liberalized later that year. Also some important public
enterprises  had been already privatized.  Either deposit  withdrawal  or credit revival  due to liberalization
caused overall financial transfer. Many of LP-AGRO  states showed  positive financial transfers.  As for
fiscal  transfer, no NON-AGRO  states recorded  positive  fiscal transfers.
The year 1993  shows  a negative  correlation  between  the two  transfers.  (Figure 9) The commercial
banks were privatized  in 1991-2  and were very  active in making loans. The government  showed  a fiscal
surplus.  All the states except  two  showed  positive  financial  transfers,  while no NON-AGRO  states showed
positive  fiscal transfers.  The outlier  state  which recorded  a level higher than 30 % for the fiscal  transfer  to
GSP ratio was Tlaxcala.
In sum, no  clear-cut relationships are observed  between the fiscal transfer and the financial
28transfer. This finding  could be vely important  because  this gray relationship  confirm  neither  the hand-in-
hand relationship  between  public  funds and private  funds, nor division-of-labor  relationship  between  the
two. Thus, this finding might suggest us that there are something  beyond simple nation-wide  common
interactions  over  the country.
5.  Concluding  Remarks
There are a number of findings that merit recapitulation  and also there are several issues to be
explored  further.
First, key  findings and some  thoughts  around  them.
1) Macroeconomic  conditions and policies have exerted strong impacts on the overall level of
resource transfers  between  the productive  sector as a whole and the financial  and fiscal sectors. These
impacts  have  been observed  at the level of the broad disaggregation  adopted  in this paper.
2) Resource  transfers  between  productive  sectors  were not necessarily  evident  either for financial  or
fiscal transfers when considered  separately, largely  because of the macroeconomic  impacts mentioned
above. Combined  intersectoral  transfers were significant in three out of the four periods we examined,
however.  The direction  of transfer  was from the NON-AGRO  states to the AGRO  states for all those three
periods.
3) It will be reasonable  to assume that fiscal transfer are more  effectively  under the control of the
govenunent,  because  the governnent is directly  involved  in the decision-making  on public  investment  and
federal participation.  If we interpret government  development  strategy from fiscal transfer figures, we
could say that the government  accord preference  to AGRO  states throughout  the past quarter century  we
have examined  in this paper.
4) Fiscal transfers  have dominated  financial  transfers  thus resulting  in the composite  intersectoral
transfer from the NON-AGRO  states to the AGRO states. This shows the Mexican government  has
maintained  a strong interventionist  stance  toward the agriculturaUrural  sector even as it has espoused  a
reduction in the role of government  in economic management. In this sense, one of the historical
characteristics  of Mexican  development  strategy  has been  maintained  through  early 1990s.
5) The distinction  between the BP-AGRO  states and the LP-AGRO  states proved instructive.
During  the shared  development  era, the LP-AGRO  states were more  favored  than BP-AGRO  states.  In the
29course of the  "reform of the agrarian reform", this  notable difference diminished and  eventually
disappeared.
6) We believe  that these  results  reflect  the political  inclination  of the Mexican  government  in favor
of the AGRO  or rural states in coping  with macroeconomic  turmoil.  From the perspective  of development
strategy,  it might be surmised  that Mexican  federal  government  has maintained  its preference  for AGRO
states in securing resource  flows but that its focus on the subsistence  sector seems to have diminished
recently.
Finally,  promising  themes  for future study:
1) Data search  and compilation:
There are a number  of issues not covered  in the present study  on resource  transfer mainly  because
of data constraint.  First, we would  like to improve  our fiscal transfer  figures  taking into account  various
fiscal subsidies.  Second,  given its importance  in the Mexican  economy,  it is desirable  to include  financial
transfers  via public  development  banks. Third,  we have not included  flows of funds related  to the issuance
and purchase of securities  of public  and private entities.  So far, we have not encountered  state-wise  data
for those  categories.
2) The factors influencing  market-mediated  transfers  and govermment-mediated  ones:
We do not know much about the decision-making  processes  and setting in the determination  of
fiscal  and financial  transfers.  Empirical  and historical  analysis  on this theme will be highly instructive  in
relating  broad development  strategy  to specific  policy  concerns.  This information  will be also valuable  in
modeling  transfers  with  explicit  identification  of specific  institutional  factors  in Mexico.
3) Understanding  of the incentive  Structure:
Even though  our provisional  conclusion  is that in Mexico  intersectoral  transfer  occurred  from non-
agricultural/urban  areas to agricultural/rural  areas in the accounting  sense,  we do not mean to claim that
in Mexico  agriculture/rural  area has been favored  in the overall  sense.  The incentive  structure  affects  the
direction and magnitude  of the flow of funds. The examination  of incentive structures  also leads to the
proper  understanding  of the policy  initiatives  on the intersectoral  transfers.
4) Institutional  factors:
Our approach  calls  for some  supplementary  viewpoints.  We do not know exactly  how the allocation
mechanism  of public  funds has changed  in the era of the "exit  of federal  government".  Comparative  study
30on institutions  impinging  on the allocation  of public  funds at state level will add valuable information  to
our study. Combined,  our approach and this type of comparative  studies  will provide  an anatomy  of the
flow  of public  funds in a more  comprehensive  way.
5) Connection  to current policy  issues (e.g.,  fiscal  federalism):
Another promising area for  future study will  be a  much more detailed focus on  federal
government's  role as redistibutor  of public  funds to state and municipal govermments.  In the literature,
much attention  has been paid to the governmental  role as provider of public goods. Given the plural
political setting and fiscal federalism proposed by the current administration, the role of transfer of
investible  funds among different regions at the different development  stages will be more important
concern.
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347. Tables  and  Figures
Table 1
Incidence of Poverty in Mexico
Million  Poor  Rest  Total Population
Extreme  Poor  Moderate  Poor  Sum
1984  National  11  19.4  30.4  41  71.4
Urban  4.3  11.9  16.2  28.7  44.9
Rural  6.7  7.5  14.2  12.3  26.5
1989  National  14.9  22.9  37.8  41.3  79.1
Urban  6.5  14.1  20.6  28.3  48.9
Rural  8.4  8.8  17.2  13  30.2
1992  National  13.6  23.6  37.2  47.1  84.3
Urban  4.8  13.5  1.8.3  31.6  49.9
Rural  8.8  10.1  18.9  15.5  34.4
|  percent  |  Poor  Rest  Total
Extreme Poor  Moderate Poor  Sum
1984  National  15.4%  27.2%  42.6%  57.4%  100.0%
Urban  6.0%  16.7%  22.7%  40.2%  62.9%
_______  D  Rural  9.4%  10.5%  19.9%  17.2%  37.1%
1989  National  18.8%  29.0%  47.8%  52.2%  100.0%
______=_  Urban  8.2%  17.8%  26.0%  35.8%  61.8%
Rural  10.6%  11.1%  21.7%  16.4%  38.2%
1992  National  16.1%  28.0%  44,1%  55.9%  100.0%
|______  |Urban  5.7%  16.0%  21.7%  37.5%  59.2%
Rural  10.4%  12.0%  22.4%  18.4%  40.8%
Source: INEGI-CEPAL, Magnitud y Evoluci6n de la pobreza en Mexico, 1984-1992, Mexico, 1993, cited in




1960-64  1965-68  1969-72  1973-76
Public Sector  l
Saving  3,0  4.5  4.2  1.2
Investment  6.5  7.5  7.3  9.2
Balance  -3.5  -3.0  -3.1  -8.0
Finance  _  __  __  __XX
Domestic  1.9  2.3  2.5  5.4
External  1.6  0.7  0.6  2.6
Private  Sector  =  _
Saving  11.7  12.2  12.8  16.6
Investment  9.9  11.1  11.8  12.3
Balance  1.8  1.1  1.0  4.3
Extemal Balance  -1.7  -1.9  -2.1  -3.7
Source: E.V.K. FitzGerald, "The Fiscal Deficit and Development Finance: A Note on the Accumulation
Balance in Mexico", Working Papers No. 35, Cetre of Latin American Studies, University of Campridge
(1979).
36Table 3
Share of Agriculture in Gross State Product
Year  1970  1975  1980  1985  1988  1993
TOTAL  12.2%  11.4%  8.4%  9.'i%  7.9%  6.8%
AG  19.2%  15.1%  13.0%  7.6%  8.1%  6.3%
BC  8.2%  8.3%  8.6%  8.  I%  _  9.1%  4.2%
BS  21.4%  17.4%  12.6%  11.3%  12.1%  9.0%
CA  29.9%  26.3%  26.3%  20.9%  3.7%  3.5%
CO  9.6%  10.1%  6.2%  6.9%  5.8%  5.2%
CL  26.4%  24.6%  16.3%  17.(%  10.6%  8.7%
CS  31.0%  25.8%  22.2%  31.1  %  19.7%  18.4%
CH  14.7%  17.4%  12.0%  15.8%  12.6%  10.6%
DF  0.3%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1%
DG  25.5%  24.8%  21.1%  24.1%  19.2%  17.4%
GT  21.2%  22.4%  12.3%  13.5%  11.0%  9.8%
GR  19.5%  17.8%  14.2%  20.9%  13.2%  10.5%
HG  16.1%  15.2%  13.0%  13.0%  8.6%  9.0%
JA  17.2%  15.1%  12.0%  12.6%  11.1%  8.7%
ME  6.2%  5.5%  4.7%  4.7%Wo  3.1%  2.7%
Mfl  24.7%  26.2%  20.6%  22.6%  16.9%  17.5%
MO  20.6%  17.3%  11.1%  9.  1  %  5.9%  11.7%
NA  31.3%  31.3%  23.8%  22.8%  16.9%  20.6%
NL  5.3%  7.5%  5.5%  6.90%/0  2.2%  1.4%
OA  25.9%  29.3%  23.3%  26.8%  20.6%  18.9%
PU  14.6%  13.0%  12.2%  12.2%  9.9%  9.0%
QT  17.9%  18.7%  11.6%  10.8%  3.8%  4.6%
QR  33.5%  12.9%  6.8%  8.9%v'o  5.0%  1.7%
SL  16.8%  15.3%  11.3%  10.4%0  10.5%  12.8%
SI  29.0%  29.2%  21.8%  26.6o  23.6%  22.8%
so  29.5%  25.0%  17.2%  21.8%  16.3%  13.5%
TA  19.5%  11.0%  7.8%  5.3%yD  7.8%  7.5%
TM  14.1%  12.2%  12.6%  13.0%,/G  12.4%  9.7%
TX  11.6%  12.8%  14.6%  13.8%/o  6.9%  8.6%
VE  19.3%  14.5%  13.3%  13.5%  11.5%  10.4%
YU  11.7%  11.0%  8.2%  9.5%1()  8.3%  9.1%
ZA  29.8%  29.3%  22.5%  30.1%/o  30.3%  25.6%
median  19.4%  16.3%  12.6%  13.0%/'o  10.5%  9.1%
Source: INEGI, (1993) Sistema de Cuentas nacionales de Mexico: Prroducto  Interno Bruto por Entidad
Federativa.
37Table 4
Share of Agriculture in Economically Ac ive Population
1960  1970  1980  1990
TOTAL  54.1%  39.4%  25.8%  22.6%
AG  49.2%  36.9%  17.9%  15.0%
BC  39.4%  22.2%  9.5%  10.4%
BS  56.2%  34.5%  19.4%  18.3%
CA  54.6%  45.8%  31.9%  34.3%
CO  44.7%  29.6%  15.8%  12.1%
CL  53.7%  43.8%  27.9%  24.0%
CS  79.4%  72.8%  57.4%  58.3%
CH  49.8%  36.4%  20.7%  17.0%
DF  2.6%  2.2%  6.1%  0.7%
DG  70.2%  55.0%  30.9%  28.6%
GT  64.2%  49.0%  19.2%  23.0%
GR  80.2%  77.8%  44.3%  36.4%
HG  71.0%  61.3%  37.0%  37.0%
JA  52.1%  34.1%  18.9%  15.1%
ME  61.2%  30.3%  15.3%  8.7%
MI  73.9%  59.0%  39.5%  34.0%
MO  60.4%  43.0%  25.1%  20.3%
NA  71.3%  59.4%  40.4%  38.2%
NL  32.2%  17.3%  8.4%  6.1%
OA  82.0%  71.5%  55.3%  52.9%
PU  67.0%  56.0%  41.4%  36.9%
QT  69.7%  48.1%  29.0%  17.9%
QR  69.1%  53.5%  29.2%  19.6%
SL  68.7%  53.3%  34.1%  31.1%
SI  65.0%  51.3%  27.5%  36.7%
SO  53.4%  38.5%  20.8%  22.7%
TA  70.9%  59.1%  38.9%  35.6%
TM  50.0%  33.1%  18.0%  16.3%
TX  68.3%  54.5%  37.7%  28.6%
VE  66.2%  53.0%  37.7%  39.4%
YU  58.9%  55.1%  31.4%  27.0%
ZA  80.1%  64.1%  49.3%  39.8%
median  64.6%  50.2%  29.1%  25.5%
Source: INEGI, Censo General de Poblaci6n y Vivienda, various issues.
38Table 5
Urbanization Ratio
1960  1970  1980  1990
TOTAL  36.5%  44.7%  51.8%  57.4%
AG  52.2%  53.5%  56.4%  68.4%
BC  72.1%  77.9%  77.7%  82.4%
BS  29.4%  35.9%  53.f %  59.2%
CA  38.6%  41.3%  47.8%  51.0%
CO  53.7%  62.7%  67.7%  79.7%
CL  51.1%  50.2%  54.6%  66.7%
CS  10.1%  14.6%  17.5%  23.5%
CH  43.8%  54.6%  60.6%  69.3%
DF  96.6%  97.1%  100.0%  98.3%
DG  23.5%  27.0%  34.5%  43.7%
GT  31.6%  39.8%  47.6%  53.7%
GR  7.9%  17.7%  23.1%  35.6%
HG  9.5%  10.1%  16.2%  25.7%
JA  40.1%  50.0%  59.7%  67.4%
NE  17.0%  44.2%  58.8%  71.1%
NMl  17.2%  25.1%  33.6%  40.6%
MO  29.0%  37.3%  32.4%  55.4%
NA  13.8%  23.0%  30.2%  38.4%
NL  64.8%  66.8%  80.3%  87.1%
OA  5.5%  10.4%  15.1%  19.9%
PU  20.4%  27.5%  31.8%  40.3%
QT  19.4%  26.6%  35.0%  46.5%
QR  0.0%  27.2%  48.2%  59.8%
SL  20.6%  28.0%  34.8%  43.2%
SI  26.0%  34.2%  41.8%  47.7%
SO  44.7%  54.3%  59.1%  67.2%
TA  11.1%  15.1%  23.4%  31.6%
TM  52.9%  61.0%  66.5%  73.3%
TX  4.6%  13.1%  24.1%  35.1%
VE  21.4%  29.1%  34.3%  37.7%
YU  30.6%  33.0%  49.6%  55.7%
ZA  10.0%  12.1%  18.2%  25.8%
median  24.8%  33.6%  44.7%  52.4%
Note: Urbanization ratio is percentage of population living in the locality which has more
than  15000 persons.
Source: INEGI, Censo General de Poblaci6n y Vivienda, various issues.
39Table 6
Various Agricultural Productivity Measures
Labor Productivity (1970)  Land Productivity (1990)  Irrigation Rate (1990)
______________  Total=100  Total=100  Total=100
AG  140  116  210
BC  184  144  678
BS  277  82  26772
CA  168  88  18
CO  131  124  517
CL  159  111  184
CS  72  53  9
CH  139  190  113
DF  64  41  2
DG  121  238  131
GT  108  122  144
GR  59  110  14
HG  49  69  65
JA  167  175  43
NE  74  76  75
_ vMl  82  85  158
MO  127  51  136
NA  129  87  121
NL  152  149  130
OA  43  59  28
PU  52  61  43
QT  97  126  70
QR  193  50  11
SL  62  125  39
SI  169  104  491
SO  358  166  1497
TA  82  57  9
TM  149  262  203
TX  33  92  35
VE  99  66  18
YU  50  129  10
ZA  92  229  29
Definitions:
Output Productivity: (Agriculture in GSP) / (Agriculture in EAP)
Land Productivity: (Agriculture in GSP) / (Agricultural Area)
Irrigation Rate: Irrigated area / Non-irrigated area
Source: Authors' caluculation based on INEGI data
40Table  7
Fiscal Transfer
(Percent  of GDP)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1988  1993
AGRO  0.64%  1.24%  3.41%01  0.07%  -0.56%  -0.73%
HP-AGRO  0.02%  -0.13%  0.46%  -0.30%  -0.40%  -0.28%
LP-AGRO  0.61%  1.37%  2.95)  0.37%  -0.16%  -0.45%
NON-AGRO  -0.24%  -1.56%  0.050%  -2.35%  -2.91%  -3.07%
Total  0.39%  -0.32%  3.46%M,  -2.27%  -3.47%  -3.80%




1980  1985  1988  1993
AGRO  -0.48%  -1.17%  1.18%  1.42%
HP-AGRO  -0.07%  -0.23%  0.70%  0.60%
LP-AGRO  -0.42%  -0.94%  0.48%  0.83%
NON-AGRO  -1.29%  0.57%  0.98%  1.83%
Total  -1.78%  -0.60%  2.17%  3.25%




1980  1985  1988  1993
AGRO  2.93%  -1.09%  0.62%  0.69%
HP-AGRO  0.40%  -0.53%  0.30%  0.32%
LP-AGRO  2.53%  -0.56%  0.32%  0.38%
NON-AGRO  -1.24%  -1.78%  -1.93%  -1.24%
Total  1.69%  -2.87%  -1.30%  -0.55%
Source:  Authors' calculation.
41Table Al
Fiscal Transfe￿  by State
(Percent of Gross State Product)
1980  1985  I  t988  1993
National  3.63%  -2.26%  -3.47%  -3.80%
AG  -1.47%  -3.59%  -1.03%  -1.75%
BC  6.60%  -2.69%  T  -3.32%  -5.06%
BS  25.30%  3.65%  1  .04%  0.31%
CA  64.83%  8.27%  4.67%  2.08%
CO  11.67%  j  -3.19%  -5.20%  -2.48%
CL  19.08%  3  3.22%  0.22%  -3.11%
Cs  16.91%  -1.45%  -1.57%  1.70%
CH  -0.08%  _  -4.92%  -5.82%  -5.83%
DF  0.24 %  -i.98%  -2.19%  -3.39%
DG  2.72%  -4.27%  -5.14%  -4.24%
CT  -0.01%  I  .81%  -6.31%  -5.73%
GR  4.63%  I  -0.29%  -4.20%  -3.40%
HG  3.22%  if  2.56%  -3,77%  0.96%
JA  I  -3.36%  -6.36%  -6.86%  -6.66%
MDE  -4.07%  -6.05%  -7.26%  -5.63%
MN  4.91%  _  8.04%  5.78%  -4.04%
MO  -2.94%  -3.81%  -5.87%  -6.15%
NA  4.43%  -2.08%  -2.41%  3.54%
NIL  '  -2.64%  -5.73%  -7.45%  1  -7.54%
OA  j  10.39%  -0.40%  2.58%  0.04%
PU  -2.93%  j  -4.89%  -5.94%  I  -5.53%
QT  |  0.30%  |  -3.58%  -5.64%  -4.81%
QR  10.50%  1.19%  -2.57%  -7.14%
SL  1.49%  -2.02%  -5.21%  -2.70%
SI  8.59%  -. 42%  -4.61%  -3.91%
SO  1.95%  -2.86%  -0.97%  0.71%
TA  20.76%  -0.28%  6.64%  I  7.07%
TM  13.31%  r  -0.94%  -2.68%  _  -6.42% I  ~ ~  ~  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  -6.42 %
TX  1.39%  t  -5.64%  -2.46%  33.10%
yE  18.10%  1  2.78%  0.31%  7  -4.40%
YU  2.60%  -2.64%  -4.43%  -6.12%
ZA  5.61%  j  -3.20%  -5.26%  -4.93%
NON-AGRO  0.08%  -3.96%  -4.79%  -4.89%
HP-AGRO  4.73%  |  -2.72%  -3.57%  -2.61%
LP-AGRO  11.24%  1.23%  -0.57%  -1.69%
Source: Authors' caiculation.
42Table A2
Financial Transfer by State
(percent of Gross State Product)
1980  1985  1988  1993
National  -1.86%  -0.60%  2.16%  3.63%
AG  -3.48%  -5.67%  3.55%  3.02%
BC  -5.40%  -1.07%  -3.23%  5.62%
BS  -1.21%  -4.58%  3.65%  0.79%
CA  -2.69%  -0.41%  1.42%  3.80%
CO  -1.87%  -3.85%  3.69%  2.44%
CL  -4.45%  -4.43%  3.03%  6.26%
CS  -0.03%  -2.68%  3.22%  3.23%
CH  1.59%  -2.31%  4.96%  6.87%
DF  -2.66%  5.83%  1.12%  -2.18%
DG  1.27%  -3.94%  2.15%  4.27%
GT  -0.13%  -6.56%  6.31%  7.37%
GR  -1.25%  -3.47%  1.91%  0.59%
HG  -1.09%  4.43%  2.03%  0.51%
JA  -6.35%  -2.44%  1.71%  12.75%
ME  1.37%  -0.20%  1.32%  4.79%
NU  -1.24%  -7:.86%  5.40%  5.89%
MO  -2.40%  -5.07%  1.35%  5.34%
NA  -2.85%  -5.57%  3.07%  1.64%
NL  -1.15%  1.71%  0.70%  7.57%
OA  -2.68%  -4.92%  0.33%  0.94%
PU  -0.43%  -2.49%  1.63%  7.12%
QT  0.59%  1.31%  1.54%  4.73%
QR  -0.85%  -1.03%  3.95%  3.69%
SL  -2.93%  -0.92%  -2.77%  -3.70%
Si  -3.40%  -1.13%  5.77%  6.98%
SO  -0.45%  0.40%  1  1.73I  %  7.73%
TA  -0.70%  -1.61%  2.82%  5.97%
TM  -4.42%  -5.28%  4.73%  3.60%
TX  -0.85%  -2.12%  1.66%  0.79%
VE  -2.74%  -3.57%  0.06%  4.32%
Y'U  -4.59%  -4.83%  4.63%  6.84%
ZA  -1.74%  -5.13%  2.87%  2.71%
NON-AGRO  -2.18%  0.97%  1.61%  3.25%
HP-AGRO  -0.67%  -2.08%  6.18%  6.17%
LP-AGRO  -1.59%  -3.11%  1.72%  3.48%
Source: Authors' calculation.
43Table A3
Public Investment and Participation
(Percent of Gross State Product)
1980  1985  1988  1993
TOTAL  13.9%  7.0%  8.2%  7.8%
AG  8.7%  5.8%  10.6%  9.8%
BC  16.8%  5.7%  8.3%  6.5%
BS  35.4%  12.5%  11.7%  11.9%
CA  74.9%  9.3%  16.3%  13.6%
CO  21.9%  5.7%  6.5%  9.1%
CL  28.8%  11.8%  11.9%  8.5%
CS  23.9%  6.4%  10.1%  13.3%
CH  10.1%  4.2%  5.8%  5.7%
DF  12.0%  10.1%  9.5%  8.2%
DG  13.0%  4.4%  6.5%  7.3%
GT  10.2%  3.4%  5.4%  5.8%
GR  14.8%  7.7%  7.5%  8.2%
HG  13.5%  10.3%  7.9%  12.5%
JA  6.9%  3.2%  4.8%  4.9%
ME  6.2%  2.9%  4.4%  5.9%
MI  15.2%  17.8%  17.4%  7.5%
MO  7.2%  3.9%  5.8%  5.4%
NA  14.6%  6.1%  9.3%  15.1%
NL  7.5%  3.5%  4.2%  4.0%
OA  20.5%  7.6%  14.2%  11.6%
PU  7.3%  4.0%  5.7%  6.0%
QT  10.5%  4.1%  6.0%  6.8%
QR  20.7%  9.1%  9.  1%  4.4%
SL  11.7%  6.7%  6.5%  8.9%
SI  18.7%  7.5%  7.1%  7.7%
SO  12.2%  5.4%  10.7%  12.3%
TA  25.7%  10.1%  18.3%  18.6%
TM  23.3%  8.1%  9.0%  5.1%
TX  11.9%  4.2%  9.2%  44.7%
VE  27.4%  11.3%  12.0%  7.2%
YUJ  13.1%  6.8%  7.2%  5.4%
ZA  15.9%  4.8%  6.4%  6.6%
NON-AGRO  10.9%  6.1%  6.9%  6.7%
HP-AGRO  14.9%  6.0%  8.1%  9.0%




(Percent  of  Gross State Product)
1980  1985  1988  1993
TOTAL  4.8%  4.9%  4.9%  7.8%
AG  5.2%  3.5%  5.2%  2.4%
BC  5.4%  4.0%  3.6%  6.3%
BS  4.4%  1.3%  2.8%  -0.2%
CA  2.9%  0.4%  0.7%  3.0%
CO  4.5%  2.1%  3.6%  4.3%
CL  2.6%  1.8%  1.6%  6.3%
Cs  2.8%  1.4%  2.4%  3.3%
CH  6.3%  2.9%  4.4%  7.8%
DF  8.4%  13.8%  10.2%  14.0%
DG  3.7%  0.9%  2.4%  5.0%
GT  5.8%  2.6%  4.4%  6.9%
GR  2.4%  1.1%  1.2%  1.  1%
HG  1.7%  0.3%  1.1%  1.0%
JA  1.7%  4.9%  4.7%  18.0%
ME  1.9%  1.2%  1.2%  2.8%
MI  3.6%  2.9%  3.2%  4.2%
MO  1.6%  1.  1%  0.8%  4.9%
NA  2.0%  0.9%  2.3%  1.5%
NL  7.5%  5.5%  8.3%  9.0%
OA  1.6%  0.5%  1.3%  1.6%
PU  3.0%  3.2%  4.8%  7.6%
QT  7.8%  1.5%  1.1%  5.0%
QR  3.6%  3.2%  5.7%  3.1%
SL  3.7%  4.4%  2.1%  2.6%
SI  4.8%  5.5%  5.1%  5.2%
SO  6.3%  5.6%  9.6%  6.5%
TA  1.0%  1.0%  1.2%  5.5%
TM  4.6%  2.0%  2.8%  3.4%
TX  1.5%  0.7%  1.2%  1.2%
VE  2.2%  1.4%  1.8%  3.4%
YU  3.5%  4.0%  4.3%  6.6%
ZA  3.0%  1.0%  1.4%  _  5.2%
NON-AGRO  5.7%  6.8%  6.0%  9.9%
HP-AGRO  5.1%  3.5%  5.3%  5.8%




State  Indigeneous Language Speaking People:

































Souce: Banamex, M6xico Social 1994-1995.
46Table A6
Eiido Use  (1988)
Ejido  Use (percent)
Total Land  Ejido Land  Agicultu  Forest  Pastoral  Other
ral Ejido  Ejido  Ejido  Uses
State  (ha.)  (ha.)  Percent  Irrigated  Rain-fed
Tolal  195,820,100  95,108,066  48.6%  3.5  17.8  17.3  57.0  4.3
AG  547,100  240,297  43.9%  13.8  29.4  1.3  55.5  0.1
BC  6,992,100  5,113,394  73.1%  2.8  1.6  0.9  93.5  1.2
BS  7,347,500  5,051,062  68.7%  0.4  0.0  0.4  97.9  1.3
CA  5,081,200  3,115,750  61.3%  0.3  10.6  53.0  35.1  1.0
CO  14,998,200  6,284,397  41.9%  1.9  2.1  2.5  90.4  3.1
CL  519,100  289,291  55.7%  10.8  24.4  21.3  40.1  3.4
CS  7,421,100  3,130,892  42.2%  1.7  39.2  22.4  29.5  7.3
CH  24,493,800  9,748,552  39.8%  2.2  9.6  24.8  59.7  3.7
DF  147,900  66,213  44.8%  0.0  42.4  38.7  11.8  7.0
DG  12,318,100  8,028,347  65.2%  1.3  8.0  28.7  57.8  4.1
GT  3,  049,100  1,154,565  37.9%  17.4  37.8  4.3  38.3  2.3
GR  6,428,100  3,771,753  58.7%  2.0  34.8  20.9  41.0  1.4
HG  2,081,300  912,550  43.8%  5.2  38.9  11.5  36.9  7.5
JA  8,083,600  3,046,499  37.7%  4.8  27.5  22.8  40.8  4.1
ME  2,135,500  1,068,096  50.0%  9.0  45,6  20.9  20.8  37.0
MI  5,992,800  2,692,184  44.9%  9.8  26.9  20.3  38.2  4.8
MO  495,000  311,492  62.9%  19.0  35.8  11.6  27.4  6.2
NA  2,697,900  2,118,246  78.5%  6.0  20.9  23.6  47.0  2.5
NL  6,492,400  1,868,555  28.8%  2.0  10.0  9.3  78.3  0.4
OA  9,395,200  7,412,619  78.9%  1.7  34.9  29.0  25.8  8.7
PU  3,390,200  1,545,634  45.6%  5.2  35.4  9.2  46.1  4.1
QT  1,144,900  547,764  47.8%  7.7  22.7  10.7  56.2  2.7
QR  5,021,200  2,743,286  54.6%  0.1  12.2  61.9  25.7  0.0
SL  6,306,800  3,717,396  58.9%  1.8  19.1  5.3  68.1  5.6
SI  5,832,800  3,230,533  55.4%  15.4  20.9  15.8  43.3  4.6
SO  18,205,200  5,664,948  31.1%  4.9  1.7  4.9  76.8  11.7
TA  2,526,700  1,011,991  40.1%  0.2  22.8  9.4  56.1  11.6
TM  7,938,400  2,398,191  30.2%  9.6  23.7  9.4  55.1  2.2
TX  401,600  190,883  47.5%  7.3  66.7  10.6  14.6  0.8
VE  7,169,900  2,840,561  39.6%  2.6  43.4  9.5  40.4  4.1
YU  3,840,200  2,162,147  56.3%  2.3  24.4  12.5  49.6  12.0
ZA  7,325,200  3,629,978  49.6%  2.5  22.1  1.8  72.5  12.0
Source: Banamex, Mexico Social 1994-1995.
47Table A7
Agrarian Ejidosand  Communities (1991)
Total  Parcelized  Non  Number of  Number of Ejidatarios
Ejido Land  Parcelized  Ejidos and
(ha.)  Communities
State  Total  With  Without
Individual  Individual
Parcel  Parcel
'Tolal  102,876,789  28,440,523  74,436,269  29,951  3,538,948  3,022,340  516,608
AG  241,235  102,071  139,164  180  15,800  14,928  872
BC  5,916,599  413,918  5,502,681  224  16,218  10,523  5,695
BS  5,478,391  24,470  5,453,921  100  6,076  2,611  3,465
CA  3,498,252  781,490  2,716,762  401  39,676  31,707  7,969
CO  7,087,020  312,692  6,774,328  881  55,131  46,517  8,614
CL  334,101  227,389  106,712  153  13,130  11,688  1,442
CS  4,063,563  2,278,911  1,784,652  2,072  248,097  235,386  12,711
CH  9,897,017  980,421  8,916,596  953  105,839  84,769  21,070
DF  59,057  13,602  45,455  43  33  10,469  22,905
DG  8,415,947  944,878  7,471,069  1,083  138,252  88,054  50,198
GT  1,224,047  697,959  526,089  1,480  98,245  93,537  4,708
GR  4,488,730  1,935,303  2,553,427  1,223  198,201  175,430  22,771
HG  1,072,810  524,530  548,280  1,157  160,037  148,104  11,933
JA  3,146,372  1,766,528  1,379,844  1,389  131,526  117,800  13,726
ME  1,155,185  691,845  463,340  1,238  287,330  252,135  35,195
MI  2,750,829  1,477,235  1,273,594  1,846  197,230  158,080  39,150
MO  381,905  190,733  191,172  239  47,983  45,330  2,653
NA  2,199,951  759,424  1,440,527  401  63,045  56,431  6,614
NL  2,273,571  242,696  2,030,875  608  34,245  28,623  5,622
OA  7,663,594  2,884,056  4,779,539  1,646  424,260  355,764  68,496
PU  1,578,588  692,462  886,126  1,146  175,941  158,041  17,900
QT  594,592  189,483  405,109  360  34,377  30,692  3,685
QR  2,795,064  615,539  2,.179,525  267  29,624  21,495  8,129
SL  4,177,816  1,005,379  3,172,437  1,263  136,340  128,790  7,550
SI  3,728,481  1,684,289  2,044,192  1,263  137,056  121,085  15,971
SO  5,811,793  930,459  4,881,334  851  72,734  34,416  38,318
TA  1,114,778  826,403  288,376  761  53,601  50,549  3,052
TM  2,449,224  1,051,781  .1,397,443  1,370  75,252  68,983  6,269
TX  194,675  151,929  42,746  240  39,771  38,541  1,230
VE  2,944,094  2,474,609  469,485  3,612  256,748  236,580  20,168
YU  2,295,243  640,776  1,654,467  726  113,582  71,828  41,754
ZA  3,844,265  927,263  2,917,002  775  100,227  93,454  6,773
Source: Banamex, Mexico Social 1994-1995.
48Table A8
Flow of Funds (flow)
(percent of GDP)
Average of following  years: from  1969  1973  1977  1980  1983  1986  1989  1992
to  1972  1976  1979  1982  1985  1988  1991  1994
Financial  Sector
Funds to Private Sector  #N/A  #N/A  5.3  3.8  4.7  5.7  8.3  10.2
Funds to Public Sector  2.5  5.4  3.7  8.3  7.4  9.7  0.9  -2.1
Net Change in Foreign  Currency Denominated  3.8  -2.1  0.5  -1.9  0.1  -0.6  -0.7  -2.3
Assets  (exc. Central Bank's Foreign Reserve)  . I
Non-classified  Resources  #N/A  #N/A  -0.5  -1.6  -1.9  -2.4  -0.1  0.0
Funds Supplied from Private Sector  #N/A  #N/A  9.0  8.6  10.3  12.4  8.4  5.8
Private Sector  _
Funds to Financial Sector  #N/A  #N/A  9.0  8.6  10.3  12.4  8.4  5.8
Funds from Financial Sector  #N/A  #N/A  5.3  3.8  4.7  5.7  8.3  10.2
Net Supply of Funds to Financial Sector  -3.3  -0.1  3.7  4.8  5.6  6.7  0.1  -4.4
Government  Securities Purchase  #N/A  #NIA  #N/A  0.9  1.0  4.3  2.3  -0.3
Foreign Debt(net)  -2.3  3.2  0.2  -1.0  -3.6  -1.3  3.7  4.1
Net Supply  of Funds of Private Sector  -1.0  -4.3  3.6  6.7  10.2  12.3  -1.3  -8.9
Public Sector
Funds from Financial Sector  2.5  5.4  3.7  8.3  7.4  9.7  0.9  -2.1
Government Securities Purchase of Private Sector  #N/A  #N/A  #N/A  0.9  1.0  4.3  2.3  -0.3
Foreign Debt (net)  0.6  2.6  3.1  3.3  1.5  0.5  -1.2  0.8
Statistical Discrepancy  -0.6  -0.9
Consolidated Public Sector Deficit  3.1  8.0  6.3  12.2  9.9  14.5  1.9  -1.7
External Sector
Foreign Debt of Financial Sector (net) * excluding  3.8  -2.1  -0.5  1.9  -0.  1  0.6  0.7  2.3
Central Bank's Foreign  Reserve  _  _
Foreign  Debt of Private  Sector (net)  -2.3  3.2  0.2  -1.0  -3.6  -1.3  3.7  4.1
Foreign  Debt of Public Sector (net)  0,6  2.6  3.1  3.3  1.5  0.5  -1.2  0.8
Capital Account Surplus  2.1  3.7  2.8  4.1  -2.3  -0.2  3.2  7.2
(Central Bank's Foreign  Reserve Change)  #NIA  #N/A  #N/A  #N/A  0.9  0.5  1.5  -1.0
Current Account Surplus  -2.1  -3.7  -2.8  -4.1  2.3  0.1  -3.1  -7.2
Total Assets of FinanCal Insfitutions, Percent of
GDP
Banco de M6xico  8.3  12.1  16.7  17.1  18.8  15.8  11.2  9.4
Development  Bank  15.7  16.6  19.4  19.7  23.7  28.3  16.1  15.3
Commercial Bank  30.9  26.9  26.5  29.1  29.0  28.0  29.5  45.3
Total  54.9  55.6  62.6  65.9  71.5  72.1  56.8  70.0
Credit to Government in Total Credit, Percent  _
Development  Bank  23.0  40.5  46.0  34.4  46.6  59.5  59.8  44.8
Commercial Bank  2.2  2.7  3.6  9.4  20.3  29.0  6.3  2.8
Total  10.3  19.5  23.6  21.5  33.6  45.4  25.1  13.8
CPI Inflation (annual average, %)  4.7  16.6  21.4  37.0  74.0  109.9  23.1  10.7
Real GDP growth (annual average, %)  6.5  6.1  6.9  r5.1  0.6  -0.2  3.8  2.3
Source: E. V. K. Fitzgerald, "The Fiscal Deficit and Development  Finance: A Note on the  Accumulation Balance in Mexico",  Center of Latin
American  Studies, Working Paper number 35, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1979,
Banco de M6xico,  Indicadores Econ6micos, various years.
Nafin, M6xico  en cifias, various years.
49Figure 1
Agriculture  and Non-Agriculture:  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate  (Moving  Average  of 3 Years)
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50Figure 2
Agricultural  - Rural sector (a)  Non Agricultural  - Urban sector (n)
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52Figure 4: Mexican States
Abbreviations  for the States
Number  State  Abbreviation  Number  State  Abbreviation
1  Aguascalientes  AG  17  Morelos  MO
2  Baja  Califomia  BC  18  Nayarit  NA
3  Baja  California  Sur  BS  19  Nuevo  Le6n  NL
4  Campeche  CA  20  Oaxaca  OA
5  Coahuila  CO  21  Puebla  PU
6  Colima  CL  22  Queretaro  QT
7  Chiapas  CS  23  Quintana  Roo  QR
8  Chihuahua  CH  24  San  Luis  Potosi  SL
9  Distrito  Federal  DF  25  Sinaloa  Si
10  Durango  DG  26  Sonora  SO
11  Guanajuato  GT  27  Tabasco  TA
12  Gurrero  GR  28  Tamaulipas  TM
13  Hidalgo  HG  29  Tlaxcala  TX
14  Jalisco  JA  30  Veracruz  VE
15  Mexico  ME  31  Yucatan  YU
16  Michoacan  Ml  32  Zacatecas  ZA
53Figure  5: Classification  of Mexican  States
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Fiscal Transfer  & Financial  Transfer
relative  to GSP, 1985
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56Figure  8
Fiscal Transfer & Financial Transfer
relative  to GSP, 1988
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57Figure 9
Fiscal  Transfer  & Financial Transfer
relative to GSP, 1993
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